There has been much debate over changes in state supreme court elections. However, most of the research that debate refers to considers a relatively short time span. This article reports an analysis of contestation and competitiveness in state supreme elections for the entire post-World War II period. The paper considers both primary and general elections (other than retention elections). The central finding of the paper is that outside the South there has been surprisingly little change, either in whether incumbents are challenged for reelection or in the competitiveness of the elections that are contested (looking separately at open seat elections and elections involving incumbents). The analysis suggests that the apparent increase in competiveness (taken to include the question of whether or not an incumbent is challenged), at least through 2009, reflects factors other than changes in the nature of campaigns and expenditures on state supreme court elections; specifically, those changes largely result from the end of the one-party South
I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I examine one dimension of change in state supreme court elections:
competitiveness. Specifically, has the likelihood increased that elections for seats on the various ___________________ Assembling the data for the analysis presented in this paper proved to be a significant undertaking. While for many states the information is readily available online or in published form (e.g., in state "blue books," "legislative manuals," and the like), for others the information is to be found only available in archives or in local newspapers which could be obtained only on microfilm via interlibrary loan. I received tremendous assistance in this endeavor from reference librarians and interlibrary loan staff at the University of Wisconsin Law Library, the William Mitchell College of Law Library, and the University of Minnesota Law Library. A number of individuals in state election offices were extremely helpful and responsive, as were a number of scholars who provided me with data from their states and/or answered questions about possible sources for their states. I would particularly like to thank Jess Clayton who worked as a project assistant for me at the University of Wisconsin. Melinda Gann Hall generously provided me with tabulations she had done based on data compiled by the Brennan Center; Adam Skaggs at the Brennan Center provided with a prelease copy of the Center's 2010 report and spreadsheets with data on advertising in 2006 and 2008. Reviewers for the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies provided several valuable suggestions. Finally, I acknowledge support I received from the University of Wisconsin Graduate School and the University of Wisconsin Political Science Department. courts will be contested and, for those that are contested, are the elections more likely to be competitive? The issue is relevant for the recurring debate over judicial selection in the states, a debate that is likely to increase in intensity in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. ___ (2010), a decision which has the potential to produce a flood of corporate expenditures in judicial, as well as other, elections.
There is no doubt that state supreme court elections have changed in some ways. Thanks to reports produced by New York University Law School's Brennan Center (Goldberg, Holman, and Sanchez 2000; Goldberg, Samis, Bender, and Weiss 2004; Goldberg and Sanchez 2004; Sample, Jones, and Weiss 2007) (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey 2010, 8) Hall (2011) found that the proportion of elections featuring attack ads had been fairly stable over the period: 11.1%, 16.3%, and 10.6%; for 2008 the corresponding figure is 11.6%. 2 Based on information appearing in Brennan Center reports or provided to me by staff at the Brennan Center, the percentage of airings that were attack ads for 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006: 38.4%, 7.5% or 9.9%, 22.5%, 20 .0%, and 26.1%; the ambiguity for 2002 reflects that the Brennan Center report shows a percentage as well as providing the data themselves, and my calculation from the data (7.5%) differs from the summary figure in the report (9.9%).
-3-More relevant for the analysis presented in this article is the role of competitiveness and contestation in such elections, and whether competition is a positive or a negative. Democratic theory would lead one to see competitive elections as a good thing because it would be indicative of an active public debate and this is just as true for judicial elections as for elections to other types of public office (see Bonneau and Hall 2009 In fact, the evidence regarding increased competition in recent years is mixed. Melinda Gann Hall has examined the question of whether state supreme court incumbents were challenged in elections (both partisan and nonpartisan) over the period 1980 to 2000, and found that the percent challenged grew from about 50 percent at the beginning of the period she examined to 75 percent or more at the end of the period (Hall 2007, 171 Undoubtedly there are other ways that this could be handled. However, given that relatively few states have unassigned, multi-seat elections, it is exceedingly unlikely that adopting a different approach would have a significant impact on the results that I report in this article. 12 In a number of the elections involving what I label "symbolically contested" general elections there was a much closer primary election, and that primary election is used for the statistical analysis. 13 I include in this category elections where the ultimate winner was not the top vote-getter in a first round (usually a primary) but did win the run-off. Some readers might question my categorization, and prefer to limit "competitive" elections to those in which the winner received 55 percent or less of the vote. I have repeated the analysis using the categorization; the broad patterns that I report remain the same. 14 In computing the percentage, I focus on the top two vote-getters; for example, if there were three candidates in a primary, getting 45%, 40%, and 15% respectively, I take the top two and recomputed the percentage focused on those top candidates. In this case, that percentage would be 45/85 = 52.9%. My rationale for this approach is that it is the closeness between the top two candidates that matters to the winner. 15 One other minor issue concerns retention elections. In this article I am not examining retention elections. There are two states (Utah and Montana) that have a system of nonpartisan elections with the provision that if an incumbent is not opposed, the election becomes a retention vote. I have treated such elections as unopposed nonpartisan elections.
III. ANALYSIS
The analysis that follows is presented mostly in the form of area graphs, all but one of which divide the vertical space proportionately among the three to five categories being considered.
One can think of each graph as representing a series of pie charts or as a stacked bar vertical bar graph that has been run together and smoothed. The advantage of these graphs is that it allows one to quickly see how the distribution among the categories has shifted over time. The disadvantage is that it takes a bit of effort to estimate a specific percentage other than for the category shown at the bottom of the graph. In all of the area graphs (except Figure (Table A1 ). For some of the figures the number of elections reflected in a data point is quite small, and those figures need to be treated with caution.
One can read Figure 1 by looking at a particular year and estimating the percentage for that year.
For example, for 1990 the figure shows that in 17
• 7% of the elections incumbents lost (dark gray area)
• 26% of the election incumbents won with less than 60% of the vote (medium gray area) • 15% of the elections incumbents won with 60-74% of the vote (white area) • 2% of the elections incumbents won with 75% or more of the vote (black area) • 40% of the elections incumbents were unopposed (light gray area)
As the figure shows, there is a lot of year-to-year variation; my interest is in patterns of change of a period of years.
A first point to note is that while Figure 1 shows some are shifts, they are generally relatively subtle as opposed to striking. There is no clear pattern in the likelihood of incumbents being defeated (the bottom-most area shown in dark gray), although arguably there is a slight increase starting around 1988. If one combines elections where incumbents lost with those which I have labeled as competitive (i.e., combine the bottom two areas shown in medium and dark gray), there does appear to be some pattern of increase starting in the 1970s. And while the graph shows a decrease in the proportion of incumbents who were unchallenged (the top-most area in the figure shown in light gray), one also sees that there was a period when the likelihood of being unchallenged actually increased, and while percent unchallenged in the current period is lower than earlier periods, how much lower depends on what one chooses to use as a baseline.
One obvious question is whether the pattern of change is random or reflects systematic differences. To assess this, question, I compared the eight years starting in 1946 (the "early period", n=293) with the eight years ending in 2009 (the "late period", n=185), and I collapsed the first two categories (elections where the incumbent lost and elections where the incumbent 17 A spreadsheet showing the detail for each of the figures is available at https://netfiles.umn.edu/users/kritzer/www/research/JELS2010-JudicialElectionFigures.xlsx. received less than 60 percent of the vote) and the last two categories (where the incumbent was unopposed or won with 75 percent or more of the vote. 18 A simple goodness-of-fit (GOF) chi square test for all elections involving incumbents shows that the difference between the early and late periods is not statistically significant (• 2 =3.34, df = 2, p=.188). One issue with the use of the simple chi square test is that it assumes that all observations are statistically independent, something with is clearly untrue given that there are multiple elections from a given state.
However, the impact of this kind of nonindependence tends to inflate the statistical significance of the tests because the practical effect of such dependence is that one has less information than the test assumes. Hence, when the chi square fails to achieve statistical significance, one can be confident that an adjustment of the clustering of observations within states would not change the conclusion from nonsignificance to statistically significant.
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What about the dip in the middle of the period? To assess whether this introduces a statistically significant difference, I created a ten-year "middle" period covering 1966 through 1975; the GOF chi square test using three periods is statistically significant (• 2 =35.48, df = 4, p<.001). In order to adjust for the nonindependence problem discussed in the previous paragraph, I used Stata to fit a simple multinomial logistic regression model with dummy variables for the late and middle periods (the early period served as the reference category) obtaining robust standard errors with clustering on state, and did a general linear hypothesis test of the four parameters. The resulting Wald-test chi square is 25.86 (4 df, p<.001), confirming that the dip in 18 I also ran the chi square tests without collapsing the five categories, and the results did not change, although the number of observations in the "incumbent defeated" and "75-99% categories was very small for some of the later figures discussed in the following pages. Generally, where the cell frequencies are low, I also ran Fisher's Exact test; the significance levels were virtually identical to what I found for the GOF chi square test, and hence I do not report the significance levels for Fisher's Exact. 19 I in fact ran the tests that adjusted for nonindependence for all of the tests reported as nonsignificant and the adjusted tests were also nonsignificant. To summarize the pattern of change for elections involving incumbents, the major change is concentrated in southern states with partisan elections. In nonpartisan elections and in partisan (and mixed) elections outside the South there have been at most relatively modest shifts, largely 25 Two questions that might be raised about the pattern in Figure 5a are (1) whether it is driven by changes in which states in the South employed partisan elections, and (2) whether it was driven by one or two states. As for the first question, all of the states were present for the first two periods, and hence the drop during the middle period does not reflect a change in the states represented in Figure 5a . Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee abandoned partisan elections before the start of the late period; however, restricting the analysis to the remaining states (Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas) produces the same pattern, and the pattern shows statistically significant shifts over time (GOF •   2 =49.77, p<.001). As for the second question, in the late period, Texas provides almost 26 of the 38 elections, so an obvious question is whether Texas is driving the results. Separate tabulations for Texas and for the other states as a group (Alabama, Louisiana, and North Carolina) show that the pattern holds for both Texas and the other states, and that the pattern of change is statistically significant for both (GOF • 2 =29.06, p<.001 for Texas and GOF • 2 =27.50, p<.001 for the other three states). Note that the sample sizes here were too small to apply the multinomial logit analysis. a decline in the number of uncontested elections. However, that decline has not translated into an increase in competitive elections.
B. Open Seat Elections
As shown in Figure 2b , in most years well under 30 percent of seats up for election did not have an incumbent seeking to retain his or her position; consequently there are many fewer open seat elections for state supreme courts than there are elections involving incumbents. In part this is the normal pattern of incumbents seeking reelection, but it also reflects the fact that in many states that ostensibly elect the members of the state supreme court, midterm vacancies are filled through an appointment process. Cutting the other way are three states (Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania) that rely on retention elections to retain incumbents but which require a partisan election when a vacancy occurs. 26 In some states requiring such elections, the governor can appoint someone to fill the seat until the election. In a number of cases, the governor appointed someone who pledged not to run in the election which insured an open seat election. In others, the appointee ran for the seat, and I group those elections with elections involving an incumbent. 27 One of the open seat elections was a last minute vacancy which was conducted entirely as a write-in election; it is omitted from the analysis. Two of the elections where incumbents lost at party conventions (both in Tennessee), the party's nominee was unopposed in the subsequent election; those two elections are also omitted from the analysis.
FIGURE 6: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, ALL OPEN SEAT ELECTIONS, 1946-2009
in the figure) , with that increase coming from both uncontested elections and noncompetitive elections. There may be a slight dip in the proportion of elections that were competitive during the 1960s. However, comparing the early and late periods does not reveal any statistically significant change (GOF • 2 =1.80, p=.406). As before, we need to look separately at nonpartisan and partisan plus mixed elections. Figure 7 shows separate patterns for the two broad types of elections. While the patterns appear to differ, we need to treat those differences with caution because GOF chi square tests for examining change over time for each of these two subsets generally fail to achieve statistical significance. For nonpartisan elections, while the percentage of elections that are competitive is greater than it was during the earliest years shown, the period of highest competitiveness appears Exactly why the patterns for the two broad types of elections may differ is not obvious, although some of what is going on here could again reflect differences due to partisan elections in the South.
29
As I noted previously, I believe that the best explanation for what has transpired in the South, and hence the bulk of the change that has occurred in the competitiveness of state supreme court elections, reflects the shift of the southern states from essentially noncompetitive one-party political systems to two-party systems. There is no clear way to "prove" that this is the explanation, but the timing of the shifting patterns in the South seems more consistent with this explanation than the alternatives, and it explains why the bulk of the change has occurred in shows the percentage of contested elections in which the contest was in the general election (i.e.,
there was a contested general election and it was closer than the primary election won by the incumbent or eventual winner). The similarity of the two lines is quite strong, and the two series correlate .75. I interpret this strong relationship as indicative that competitiveness in this set of elections was strongly related to two-party competition.
Undoubtedly there was some increase in expenditures and campaign activity with the emergence of the Republican Party in the South. However, I would argue that those increases were in response to the increased competition rather than being a cause of increased competition.
The recent debate has been over whether the sharp increases in expenditures and advertising seen during the last decade has changed the nature of competition in state supreme court elections. In other words, I am arguing that the changes in the South started around 1980 and were internal to the party system rather than reflecting the role of external players such as interest groups that provide campaign funds and run advertisements. 30 As the Republican Party became more successful in the South, various external actors increased their activities. Importantly, while such actors also increased their involvement in both partisan and nonpartisan elections outside the 30 According to data assembled by the Brennan Center, state supreme court candidates collected about $6 million for the 1989-90 biennium, and about $9.5 for the 1991-92 biennium. The next three biennia candidates raised about $21-27 million. The presidential election biennia of 1999-2000, 2003-04, and 2007-08 saw amounts around $45 million with the two off-year biennia with amounts on the order of $30 million (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey 2010: 5) . Thus, the rise in compeitiveness in the South predates the sharp increases in fundraising (and expenditures) that began to take off in the mid-1990s.
FIGURE 9: COMPETITIVENESS AND CONTESTED PARTISAN GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTHERN STATES
South, one does not see any evidence that their involvement has led to significant increases in the amount of competition.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Overall it is accurate to say that state supreme court elections have become more highly competitive, both in terms of more challenges to incumbents and in terms of a higher proportion (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey 2010,86-97) . 33 This is by no means the only question one can ask about increasing prevalence of high volume television advertising in judicial election campaigns. Another issue, which I do not address, is on the public's view of the courts (see Gibson 2009 ).
-27- Open Seat
